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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to explore the impact of corporate governance on the profitability of 
the Oil and Gas sector of Pakistan. This research is done by using secondary data that has been col-
lected from annual reports for a period of 5 years, from 2011 to 2015. To study the association be-
tween Corporate Governance and firm profitability, Co-integration, Unit root, Vector Error Correc-
tion estimates and unit Granger Causality test were used. Independent variables of the study are the 
board of independent director, the board size, board remuneration and size of the firm whereas the 
dependent variables are the return on assets and return on sales. The findings show the significant 
relationship among all variables included in this study.  Improved standards on the qualification of 
the board members are recommended to the regulators. The research can further investigate the Cor-
porate Governance impact on firm profitability in different sectors of the economy. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Profitability, ROA, ROE, Oil and Gas sector. 
  
Introduction 
There is more than one definition of the term Corporate Governance(CG). Corporate Gover-
nance is a set of systems by which a company structures, controls and operates in order to achieve 
its long-term goals and to satisfy its shareholders and stakeholders (Das, 2009). It consists of both 
hard law (Statutes etc) and the Soft law (codes of corporate governance) (Haxhi and Aguilera, 
2015). Regardless of the definition and approach adopted, CG plays a vital role in improving the 
performance of the firm (Bauer,Guenster, & Otten, 2004; Fooladi & Chaleshtori 2011; Narwal & 
Jindal, 2015).Performance improvement leads to achieving the long term goals of the firms. This is 
in accordance with the agency theory in which shareholders are principles and Board of Direc-
tors(BoD) are agents. One of the major duty of the agents is to protect the shareholders’ wealth. 
Needless to say, that growth comes later than protection. This protection fo wealth is the crux of 
most corporate laws and codes around the globe. However, the CG laws and codes are not limited to 
shareholder’s protection but also extend to other stakeholders. (La Porta et al 1997, Julien and Rieg-
er 2003) 
Pakistan is a developing country. It got its independence in August 1947 from Britain. Like 
India, Malaysia, and other commonwealth countries, Pakistan follows the Common Law regime. 
Common law regime or system works differently from the other systems e.g Civil Law. The regime 
also affects the approach that a country follows. Naturally, Pakistan follows the CG systems which 
were introduced and implemented in the United Kingdom (UK). The world has seen numerous fi-
nancial disasters in recent times. Enron and WorldCom were some of the many. Earlier than that, 
BCCI and Barings bank scandal shook the financial world. As a result, the UK government, in an 
attempt to regain the confidence of the investors and the general public in financial systems and 
market, introduced the Cadbury Report in 1992. It was soon followed by other reports ( Greenbury, 
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Hempel, Trumbull, Smith, Kings, etc ). The UK has produced 32 codes since the one came in 1992. 
(Zattoni 2016).Pakistan has produced only 3 so far. 
Pakistan Corporate law and CG package include the Companies Act 2017, Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act 1997 and Code of Corporate Governance Act 1997(SECP 
Act 1997). The code defines the way for developing good corporate governance structure of gover-
nance for the companies listed on the stock exchange of Pakistan. In the latest 2017 code, the Audit 
Committee must be chaired by an independent director. Similar new controls are introduced in the 
new code. In addition, SECP on its website declares that it will adopt any law from other jurisdic-
tions which it will see fit to regulate the companies and make them secure and profitable for the 
shareholders and stakeholders alike. 
 
Problem Statement 
If the investments to the shareholder managed by the BoD well then it will tend to grow. In 
other words, a company that is well-governed is a better company performance-wise. That is the 
theory of governance. Will it pass the real test? This research tends to see the impact on perfor-
mance in the presence of good corporate governance practices in the Oil and Gas sector of Pakistan.  
 
Research Objectives  
 To examine the impact of corporate governance on firm profitability. 
 To assess the dimension of corporate governance in term of board size, independent 
directors, board remuneration and firm size. 
Research Hypotheses 
 There are significant positive relationships among profitability and board size. 
 There is a significant positive relationship between profitability and independent di-
rectors. 
 There is a significant positive relationship between profitability and board remunera-
tion. 
 There is a significant positive relationship between profitability and firm size. 
Main hypotheses 
 To explore the relationship between corporate governance and profitability of the Oil 
& Gas sector.  
 
Literature Review 
It was observed that when the firm complies with the CG philosophy, there is an increase of 
the organization profitability what improves its competitiveness. It also helps to excel in its relation-
ship with investors, employees, business partners, and customers, etc. (Todorovic, 2013). Yasser, 
Entebang, and Mansor (2011), in their study, concluded that CG attributes (CEO duality, Audit 
Committee independence, and Board size) are positively linked to the firms' performance in Pakis-
tan. In his study of Saudi Listed companies, Ghabayen (2012) found that board characteristics had a 
significant effect on the firm’s performance. The researcher concluded that improved CG improves 
the performance of the company. 
According to Prabhakar, (2006) corporate governance is considered as a mirror which has 
the same sight as the corporate sector itself is governed. However, the limitation exists as there are 
considerable variations are always present. Julien and Rieger (2003) have given the considerations 
to the stakeholder model of corporate governance through mentioning that, corporate governance 
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system is the main contributor in the corporation to maintain and protect the interest of various 
stockholders. 
Khan, Nemati, and Ifthikar, (2011) study the impact of corporate governance on the perfor-
mance on Indian banks and find that the board of directors plays a vital role in the performance of 
banks. Latif, (2013) conducted a study to know the impact of corporate governance on firm perfor-
mance and concluded that there was a significant relationship between board size and firm perfor-
mance. Abdullah (2006) investigated the relationship between the director’s remuneration, firm per-
formance and corporate governance in Malaysia. According to the findings of his study director re-
muneration was not linked with firm whereas the board of independent directors and the extent of 
non-executive director welfare negatively manipulate the director’s remuneration and also strong 
negative relation among return on assets and director’s remuneration. (Olagunju, 2013) another 
study in the context of developing Asian countries and taking Indian companies sample data. Arora 
and  Sharma (2016) concluded that not all the attributes of the CG are directly linked to the perfor-
mance of the firm. One example was the duality if the CEO, researcher did not find any relation be-
tween that and the performance. In another Asian developing country study, Azeez 2015 found the 
negative relationship between firm performance and the board size. It was concluded that the small-
er board size worked more effectively due to a closed management style. This was in line with the 
earlier study in Sri Lankan context which concluded that smaller board size and independence had 
positively influenced firm performance (Dharmadasa, Gamage, and Herath (2014). Hodo, (2012). 
Emmanuel and Hodo (2012) investigated the impact of corporate governance on Nigerian banks 
profitability and found that there is the significant positive relationship among the board size and the 
number of shareholders, return on assets and return on equity. According to their study the quality of 
assets, equity providers and managers also have an effect on the bank performance. Muhammad 
Azam, (2011) Look at the impact of corporate governance on firm performance. Use Canonical re-
gression analysis to explore the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, 
sample size 14 oil and gas sector firms, for the time period 2005 to 2010. In this study include three 
variables to measure the firm performance suck as return on assets, return on equity and net profit 
margin. They found that there is a significant positive relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance. By better corporate governance structure firms can improve their profitabili-
ty. 
According to the study of Dar, (2011) on corporate governance and firm performance for the 
period, 2001 to 2010 it is defined that the major causes of the firm’s failure in Pakistan are lack of 
corporate governance. Regression analysis was used to see the impact of corporate governance on 
firm performance and it showed that there was a significant relationship between board size and 
profit margin of the firms. As larger the board sizes as larger the profit of the firm.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
The model shows the association along with the variables, model shows that board size, in-
dependent directors, board committees, board remuneration and firm size effects corporate gover-
nance and their impact on the firm’s profitability. The profitability of the firms is used by return on 
assets and return on sales. The more independent directors lead to enhanced corporate governance 
positively impact on the firm profitability and overall performance. 
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Diagram 1. Thematic diagram 
 
Methodology 
To measure the effects of corporate governance on the profitability of Oil and Gas sector of 
Pakistan over a period 2011-2015, same size 9 firms of Oil and Gas sectors listed on Karachi stock 
exchange, data is collected from annual reports and the state bank website, uses Co-integration, Unit 
root, Vector error correction estimates test to investigate the impact of corporate governance on the 
profitability of the Oil and Gas sector of Pakistan. Independent variables of the study are board-size, 
the board of independent directors, board remuneration and size of the firm whereas, the dependent 
variables are a return on assets, return on equity and return on sales. To know the effects of Corpo-
rate Governance on Performance of Oil and Gas Sector of Pakistan. Regression models construct for 
return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS) as be below: 
1. ROA=β0+β1BSIZEit+β2BINDDIRECTORit+β3BREMUNERATIONit 
+β4FSIZEit+ɛit 
2. ROS= β0+β1BSIZEit +β2BINDDIRECTORit +β3BREMUNERATIONit 
+β4FSIZEit+ ɛit 
Where 
                  ROA: return on assets 
ROS: return on sales 
BSIZE: board size 
BINDDIRECTOR: board independent directors 
BREMUNERATION: board remuneration 
FSIZE: total assets of the firm 
i:1 to 9 firms 
t:2011 to 2015 
u it: Error term 
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Results 
 
Table 1. Co-integration 
Hypothesized Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None * 513.6773 95.75366 0.0001 
At most 1 * 339.6355 69.81889 0.0001 
At most 2 * 194.0706 47.85613 0.0000 
At most 3 * 77.24102 29.79707 0.0000 
At most 4 14.07673 15.49471 0.0809 
At most 5 3.321074 3.841466 0.0684 
 
As the likelihood ratio has not exceeded 5% critical value, therefore, Johnson Co-integration 
rejects any co-integrating relation between corporate governance and firm profitability. The above 
table reports that variables included in this study do not move simultaneously in the long run and the 
probability value of all variable is 0.0000 which shows significant relationships among the variables. 
 
Table 2. The Result of Unit Root Investigation 
0Variables Test for a unit root in Test stat Probability 
 
Board of Independent 
Director 
1% level 
5% level 
10% level 
-3.592462 
-2.931404 
-2.603944 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
 
Board Remuneration 
1% level 
5% level 
10% level 
-3.592462 
-2.931404 
-2.603944 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
 
Board size 
1% level 
5% level 
10% level 
-3.610453 
-2.938987 
-2.607932 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0000 
 
Firm size 
1% level 
5% level 
10% level 
-3.592462 
-2.931404 
-2.603944 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0002 
 
ROA 
1% level 
5% level 
10% level 
-3.592462 
-2.931404 
-2.603944 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
 
ROS 
1% level 
5% level 
10% level 
-3.592462 
-2.931404 
-2.603944 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
 
Table 2 tells that if the unit root applies ADF test which shows stationary at first difference, 
there is a significant positive relationship between the board of independent director, board remune-
ration, the board size, firm size, return on assets and return on sales. Because the probability value of 
all variables is 0.0000.  
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Table 3. Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Cointegra-
tig Eq: 
ROS(-1) ROA(-1) FSIZE(-1) BSIZE(-
1) 
BREMUNE-
RATION(-1) 
BINDDEC-
TOR(-1) 
 
CointEq1 
 
1.00000 
-2.219694 
(0.10089) 
[-22.006] 
-4.72E-9 
(1.4E-08) 
[-0.32812] 
-3.964766 
(0.77395) 
[-5.12274] 
-2.66E-06 
(1.1E-06) 
[-2.45790] 
4.321927 
(0.56093) 
[-7.70487] 
 
VECE (Table 3) shows the significant negative association between the return on sales, re-
turn on assets, firm size, the board size, board remuneration and board of independent director be-
cause of the t value of all variables more than 2. 
 
Table 4. VAR Granger Causality/Block Erogeneity Wald Tests 
 Dependent variable: BINDDIRECTOR 
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob. 
BREMUNERA      
TIN 
58.40322 4 0.0000 
BSIZE 11.66470 4 0.0200 
FSIZE 60.09132 4 0.0000 
ROA 12.60735 4 0.0134 
ROS 18.79669 4 0.0009 
All 95.79276 20 0.0000 
 
Results of Table 4 have revealed that all independent variables have significant relationship 
with board of independent directors. Firm size and board remuneration are independent variables 
with highest magnitude 60% and 58% respectively. Size of coefficient of other independent va-
riables was not a high side although had significant impact. Impact of board size was 11% whereas 
return on assets and return on sales have 12% and 18% impact on dependent variable. Overall the 
model is significant and all independent variables have power to predict change in dependent varia-
ble.  
 
Table 5. Dependent variable: BREMUNERATION 
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob. 
BINDDIRECTOR 2.036274 4 0.7291 
BSIZE 2.599752 4 0.6269 
FSIZE 6.605817 4 0.1582 
ROA 2.548767 4 0.6359 
ROS 1.722738 4 0.7866 
All 12.97697 20 0.8784 
 
Results in Table 5 have revealed that all independent variables have insignificant impact on 
board remuneration. These findings have proved that corporate governance practices have not im-
pact on remuneration of board. Insignificance of return on asset and return on sales have shown that 
performance of a company have also no impact on remuneration of board. The results affirm that 
this model  is not good fit and unable to explain the relationship between dependent variable (Board 
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remuneration) and independent variables (board independent directors, board size, firm size, return 
on assets, return on sales).   
   
Table 6. Dependent variable: BSIZE 
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob. 
BINDDIRECTOR 5.233995 4 0.2641 
BREMUNERATIN 3.203221 4 0.5244 
FSIZE 1.612322 4 0.8066 
ROA 4.594790 4 0.3315 
ROS 4.090340 4 0.3939 
All 7.729678 20 0.9935 
 
In table 6, board size was taken as dependent variable and independent variables are tested 
for significant impact on dependent variable. Results have revealed that all independent variables 
have insignificant impact, at 5% level of significance, on board size. It means these all our indepen-
dent variables lack the ability to predict changes in board size. Overall fitness of the model was also 
not good as probability value is greater than 0.05. Through these results we can say that there may 
be some other factors which cause changes in board size. Variables included in this study are caus-
ing any changes in board size.  
 
Table 7. Dependent Variable FSIZE 
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob. 
BINDDIRECTOR 1.731435 4 0.7850 
BREMUNERATIN 3.185648 4 0.5273 
BSIZE 1.755856 4 0.7805 
ROA 2.257766 4 0.6885 
ROS 2.141911 4 0.7097 
All 6.559509 20 0.9979 
 
In Table 7 firm size was taken as dependent variable and independent variables are tested for 
significant impact on dependent variable. Results have revealed that all independent variables have 
insignificant impact, at 5% level of significance, on firm size. This mean these all our independent 
variables lack the ability to predict changes in firm size. Overall fitness of the model was also not 
good as probability value is greater than 0.05. Through these results we can say that there may be 
some other factors which cause changes in firm size. Variables included in this study are causing 
any significant change in firm size.  
 
Table 8. Dependent variable: ROA 
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob. 
BINDDIRECTOR 5.613633 4 0.2299 
BREMUNERATIN 13.37830 4 0.0096 
BSIZE 9.650840 4 0.0467 
FSIZE 10.46436 4 0.0333 
ROS 4.501742 4 0.3423 
All 34.36729 20 0.0237 
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In table 8, results have revealed that all independent variables at 5% level of significance 
have significant impact on return on assets except return on sales. Return on sales has insignificant 
impact on return on assets. These results have showed that management of a company can improve 
its performance by properly implanting corporate governance policies. Board remuneration, board of 
independent directors, and board size are popular corporate governance policies which can impact 
the return on assets. Size of firm also has significant impact on return on assets. Overall fitness of 
the model was also good and significant.   
 
Table 9. Dependent Variable: ROS 
Excluded Chi-sq Df Prob. 
BINDDIRECTOR 15.32807 4 0.0041 
BREMUNERATIN 19.70747 4 0.0006 
BSIZE 5.179552 4 0.2694 
FSIZE 8.826607 4 0.0656 
ROA 5.300820 4 0.2578 
All 50.81214 20 0.0002 
 
In the last table (table 9) board of independent directors and board remuneration have signif-
icant impact on return on sales. All other independent variables which are board size, firm size, and 
return on assets have insignificant impact on return on sales. However overall model is significant. 
Results of this model also indicate that corporate governance policies have significant influence on 
performance of a company  
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
The goal of this study is to analyze the impact of corporate governance on the profitability of 
the firms. To achieve the objective, co-integration, Granger and unit root test were used to investi-
gate the impact of corporate governance on the profitability of the Oil and Gas sector of Pakistan. 
The results of this study agree that Board size, the board of independent directors, board re-
muneration, firm’s size positively associated with return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS). 
The study also shows that better CG has a stronger impact on profitability in larger firms. The firm 
can increase its performance by improving corporate governance structure. The research can further 
look into the corporate governance impact on firm’s profitability in different sectors of the economy. 
 
Limitations of the study 
This study emphasizes on secondary data. 
Variables used in this study based on past studies, no new variable used to measure Corpo-
rate Governance and its impact on the profitability of the Oil and Gas sector of Pakistan. 
The time period of study is rather short - 2011-2015. 
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